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The Generation of Memory
Reflections on the "Me~nory BooiD"
in ConteiDporary Historical Studies
Jay Winter

J

ay Winter delivered thefollowing in the
form of a lecture at the Canadian War
Museum on 31 October 2000. A
distinguished academic, Winter has been
writing about the cultural history of the
First World War for nearly three decades.
He has taught at the University of
Cambridge in England and is presently
at Yale University. Since 1988, he has
been a director of the Historial de la
grande guerre in Peronne, an important war
museum in northern France. In this capacity, he
has becomefamiliar with a great many institutions
of war and military history around the world and
he has great knowledge and familiarity with the
important historical and intellectual debates that
will be fundamental to the creation of a new
Canadian War Museum, which is now slated to
open in May 2005.
Probably Winter's best-known book is Sites of
Memory. Sites of Mourning: the Great War in

"ll Thoever says memory, says Shoah." This
VVis the cryptic remark of one of the fathers
of the memory boom among historians over the
last 20 years, Pierre Nora, French political
scientist, publisher at the prestigious house of
Gallimard, and the agent provocateur and
inspiration behind one of the most influential
ventures in cultural history in the last 20 years,
Les lieux de memoire. In a series of stately tomes,
published between 1984 and 1992, Nora solicited
and reshaped essays by leading French scholars
which, taken together constitute an inventory of
knowledge and conjecture about memory in the
French historical context - memory as frozen in
statues, in objects, in street names, in ceremonies,
in political parties, in legends, in myths, even in
historical works. The success of this venture has
been astonishing. The collection has sold over half

European Cultural History published in
1995. In it, he argues that the rituals of
mourning
associated
with
commemoration after the First World War
had a history stretchingfar back in human
life and experience. In this he contradicts
the thinking of Canadian historian Modris
Eksteins who argued that the Great War
marked the birth q_f the modern age.
Lately, Daniel Sherman has proposed that
commemorative ceremonies and memorials are
significantly politicized in the interests q_f state
control. In thefollowing paper Winter warns against
the dangers of collective memory being collapsed
into "a set of stories formed by or about the state"
while also providing a rich overview of the great
importance that attention to memory and culture
studies has taken on in contemporary thought.
These cannot be ignored in any serious attempt to
lay the intellectualfoundation of any new museum,
and perhaps especially may have specific relevance
to a new war museum.
Laura Brandon

a million copies in France alone. All of the essays
have been translated into English, first in a threevolume edition published by Columbia University
Press under the slightly odd title of Realms of
memory; all the other chapters will appear next
year in a four-volume edition published by
University of Chicago Press. An exploration of
German sites of memory is under way; the same
is true in Italy and Portugal; and everywhere in
the Anglo-Saxon world, historians young and old
have found in the subject of memory, defined in a
host of ways, the central organizing concept of
historical study, a position once occupied by the
notions of class, race, and gender. These themes
have certainly not vanished, but they have been
reconfigured and in certain respects
overshadowed by the historical study of"memory,"
however defined.
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Clearly something important has happened in
our discipline, something we need to attend to as
more than a passing fashion. What are the origins
of the "memory boom"? What are its implications?
Is Nora right in claiming that it is one of the
cultural repercussions of the Holocaust? In
tonight's lecture I hope to show that the subject of
the Holocaust has indeed inspired a range of
reflections on the notion of memory, trauma, and
history. But there are other, distinctive sources of
the contemporary obsession with memory, which
arise out of a multiplicity of social, cultural,
medical and economic trends and developments
of an eclectic but intersecting kind. My argument
is that each of these incitements to reflection on
memory has its own inner logic and constituency,
but that the effect of their intersection is
multiplicative rather than additive. In other words,
the "memory boom" has taken off because the
impulses behind it add up to a whole greater than
the sum of its parts.

1. Memory and commemoration
ne clear invitation to much reflection on
memory has been public commemoration.
Here marking or remembering the Holocaust is a
critical problem, one mixed together in very
troubling ways with other kinds of
commemoration. It is apparent that remembering
the Holocaust has formed a significant part of the
commemoration of the victims of twentiethcentury war. The Holocaust, implemented between
1941 and 1945, has neither been fully integrated
nor has it escaped from that contextual location.

O

A second concentric circle of remembrance
surrounds both the Holocaust and the Second
World War. It is the commemorative moment
which preceded it, addressing some of the
complex issues of victimhood and bereavement
during and after the First World War. Taken
together, these intersecting commemorations litter
the calendar. In the Israeli calendar, Yom Hashoah
comes one week before Remembrance day, a
solemn recollection of Israeli soldiers who died
in war from the period prior to the foundation of
the State oflsrael until today. Yom Hazicharon is
followed immediately and with a wrenching change
of pace and mood by Israeli Independence Day.
The link between sacrifice and redemption is
clear; more on that theme in a moment. For
observant Jews, Tisha Be'av is still the time on
the Jewish calendar to recall the Third

catastrophe, the "Dritte Churbn," of the Nazi
genocide, following the two prior disasters of the
destruction of Solomon's Temple in Jerusalem in
586BC and 70AD. On this day, redemption is
linked not to the creation of the State of Israel,
but to the record of catastrophe over two millenia,
a record recalled with sadness and longing for
the day when the Messiah will arrive. "Even though
he tarries," the affirmation of faith accepts,
"nonetheless I still believe." Redemption here has
a direct, scriptural meaning.
How redemptive is the notation of the other
moments we recall on stated days of the year
marking wars? There is D-Day, VE-day, VJ day,
and the two older standbys, America's Memorial
Day, on 29 May, the anniversary of Appomattox,
and everyone's Armistice Day on 11 November.
In parts of Britain and Northern Ireland, the 1st
of July, the anniversary of the Battle of the Somme,
is marked collectively, as is dawn on 25 April, the
day Australian and New Zealand troops landed at
Gallipoli; today that day is Australian
independence day. Most are framed within a
narrative of liberty being purchased through the
shedding of blood. Here, as in Israeli
independence day, the measure is the nation state
and its hard-won expression of a nation's collective
life. And now we have 27 January, the day
Auschwitz was liberated by the Red army. Here
too commemoration cannot escape its political
framework. State-sponsored commemoration is
a politically sanctioned and politically funded rite
of remembering in public, adjusted to a publicly
or politically approved narrative. Remembering
the Holocaust at this level is an extension of earlier
twentieth-century commemorative forms. It
locates the narrative of war crimes and victimhood
within the framework of national catastrophe and
national rebirth.
The case of the new Holocaust memorial to
be built near the Brandenburg gate in Berlin shows
the implications of this commemorative setting.
The monument, a stone's throw from the new
Reichstag and from Hitler's bunker, is unavoidably
part of the story of Germany reborn. Some believe
the monument is an essential and properly-placed
part of the story; others, and I am one of them,
opposed the location of a commemorative
monument to victims of the Holocaust within such
a narrative. Placing the monument in the heart of
the national capital, geographically and
metaphorically, also draws attention away from
many original and sensitive commemorative forms
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in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. Focussing
on the national level of notation, in my view,
wrongly configures the problem of how to
remember the victims of the Holocaust. The
alternative to a national monument is not nothing;
indeed the array of local, small-scale
commemorative forms are entirely consistent with
the federal, regionalized, richly complex nature
of German cultural history, and helps show the
multiplicity of meanings of remembrance, and
indeed of history, lost in grand national narratives
like that of Daniel Goldhagen.
What is true of Germany, is true of all other
parts of Europe where memorials have been built.
In Oradour-sur-Glane, or in Draney, or on the
walls of the Jewish orphanage on the Ile St-Louis,
monuments and inscriptions help locate the
Holocaust within the particular, local context of
the scars left by total war in the twentieth century.
None of these sites can "re-present" the Holocaust;
nothing can do so in any conventional way. All
they can accomplish
and it is a lot
is to
suggest what is absent in European life because
of the genocide, and to leave the question of its
"meaning," if any, open. Daniel Liebeskind's design
for the Jewish wing of the Berlin Historical
Museum in Kreuzfeld goes a long way towards
describing this void.
But absence is not meaning. My own view is
that it is unwise to try to encapsulate the Holocaust
within any particular system of meaning. To
paraphrase Primo Levi, a set of events about which
one cannot pose the question of"why?" is also an
event about which it is impossible in any
straightforward sense to pose the questions of
historical context or meaning within twentiethcentury history.
This extended international conversation as
to the appropriate character and content of
Holocaust commemoration is bound to go on, and
I do not expect to persuade everyone in the
audience tonight of my point of view. But for our
present purposes, what is most significant about
this protracted debate is the way it has made us
reflect both on the notion of memory and on what
kind of memories are elicited by other
commemorative projects?
Whatever you think of these issues, it is clear
that the political debate over Holocaust
commemoration describes one very salient
element in the "memory boom" of the last 30 years.

Nora had a point. But the national political focus
of this story is somewhat misleading. The state is
not the sole nor even the primary source of the
recent upsurge of interest in memory, whether or
not related to the Holocaust. Once again, we have
to address processes which arise from many
different sources, some at the seat of power, some
not.
State agents, as much as those dedicated to a
state in the making, have an evident interest in
legitimating narratives; very often that is what they
mean by "collective memory" stories that polish
the cultural credentials of their claim to power.
But memory work has focussed on other
collectives too. The new Viennese memorial to
victims of the Holocaust, an installation designed
by Rachel Whiteread is a case in point; it is a very
successful urban memorial. There are many
others.
The nation is only player in this
commemorative ensemble. In some places (though
not in others) over the past 30 years, globalization
and European integration have, to a degree,
diminished the stridency of some national
narratives. In other cases, nationalism is a direct
response to the perceived dangers of globalization.
The world wide net, many French observers sadly
note, is yet another defi americain, threatening
the extinction of the Francophone world.
Nationalist rhetoric has certainly not vanished,
but it increasingly shares the stage with other
languages of collective identity. The muchheralded end of territoriality has not yet arrived,
but state-bounded narratives increasingly compete
with others of a regional or ethnic kind. On both
sides of the Atlantic, in the developed "north" and
the developing "south," many ethnic groups and
disenfranchised minorities have demanded their
own right to speak, to act, and to achieve liberation
or self-determination. And those struggles almost
always entail the construction of their own stories,
their own usable past. Collective memory is a term
that should never be collapsed into a set of stories
formed by or about the state.

2. Identity politics
ere is a second source of the robust
character of what I have called the
"generation of memory." The creation and
dissemination of narratives about the past arise
out of and express identity politics. One clear

H
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example is the placement of the National Holocaust
Memorial on the Mall in Washington. It is, in this
sacred space, both a statement of universal truths,
and an expression of Jewish-American pride.
Borrowing the notation of one literary scholar in
an entirely different context, the museum
expresses a measureless story in a grammar living
on the hyphen, the hyphen of ethnic politics.
The United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum is a spectacular success in many ways,
drawing a huge and varied population of visitors.
Its structure and organization constitute a great
achievement, bringing to millions of people of all
ages searing images of a crime without parallel.
Handing out identity cards of Holocaust victims
to visitors inscribes us from the outset in a family
of bereavement, which among other things, is a
Jewish family. Ethnic pride and ethnic sadness
are there in equal parts.
But the framework cannot escape from its
location. The redemptive elements in the story
surround it on the Mall. They tell us of the wider
struggle for tolerance, for freedom of religion, for
freedom from persecution; they locate the
Holocaust within the American narrative, itself
configured as a universal. Here we have arrived
at the right-hand side of the hyphen "JewishAmerican." The museum is the bridge between
the two.
There have been many other
instances of commemoration as an expression of
the tragic history of persecuted minorities. The
Aids quilt is one; monuments to the struggle for
African-American freedom raise the same point.
Recent attempts to configure the imprisonment
of Japanese-Americans during the Second World
War express the same set of issues, both unique
and universal. Again the hyphen of identity is
strengthened by commemoration.
In Latin America and elsewhere, testimonial
literature rescues histories trampled on by
military dictatorships. The stories of cruelty and
oppression once retold, constitute acts of defiance;
through the narrator, the voices of the dead and
the mutilated can still be heard. The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in South Mrica has
been a focus for the release of imprisoned memory.
At times, the boundaries between truth and fiction
become blurred in such story-telling. As Doris
Sommer has put it, the boundaries between
informing and performing are porous. But even
when the storyteller goes beyond what can be
verified through other sources, the voice of the

witness still stands for a generalized sense of
oppression. Here is identity politics as a set of
narratives, a "counterhistory that challenges the
false generalizations in exclusionary "History","
penned by those trapped in a Euro-centric and
imperialist sense of what constitutes the past. This
dimension of the "memory boom" has little
purchase with respect to Holocaust testimonies,
but it tells us much about other narratives of
oppression.
Developments in information technology also
help explain why the "memory boom" has taken
off over the last generation. Since the 1960s and
1970s, audio-visual and now computer-based data
banks can preserve and protect the "voice" of the
victims. Their stories can be captured, and
through listening to them or viewing them, we can
come into contact with their lives and their
tragedies.
The act of attending to such voices is what
witnessing is all about. Its religious overtones are
hard to miss. There is a kind oflaying on of hands
in such encounters. The person who suffered
knows about a mystery- the mystery of evil and
the miracle of survival- and we who listen may
thereby enter the mystery and share the miracle.
This is a difficult area to investigate, for in it there
is a kind of appropriation of suffering which raises
many difficult moral questions. Dominick
LaCapra refers to such forms of witnessing in the
language of psychoanalysis. But I doubt if
"transference" can really be a framework for those
telling and those attending to such narratives.
Over the same decades that archives of
Holocaust victims and other survivors of
oppression and injustice were constructed, the
notion of the "witness" received another kind of
validation. From the Eichmann trial in 1961 to
the French trials of Barbie, Touvier and Papon,
witnesses came forward, men like Leon WelizckerWells who made it his purpose in life to tell the
story of what had happened to him as a member
of a Sondercommando. Literary memoirs became
acts of witnessing; the success of Primo Levi's
writing is a case in point.
Timing is critical here. In the 1940s and
1950s, such witnesses were there, but their voices
were marginal to public discourse on the Second
World War. Heroic narratives of Resistance were
more useful in the revival of the political culture
of countries humiliated by occupation and
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collaboration. But by the 1960s and 1970s, that
narrative work had done its job; the transition to
post-war political stability was complete. There
was now room for the victims of the camps to
come forward. And come forward they did.
Some of their messages reinforced identity
politics, in particular the ongoing struggle against
anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial. But in other
ways, the birth of the witness was the recovery of
voices that had been there all along. It was the
disclosure of narratives which did not fit the heroic
model of the Resistance. Witnessing was another
kind, perhaps an even harder kind, of resistance.
Identity politics attended the recovery of
witnesses after the Soviet empire collapsed in
1989. A whole swathe of Eastern Europe suddenly
was stripped ofits politically-dominant narratives.
Berlin was now unified in contemplation of a single
past. From Potsdam to Moscow, vast arrays of
documents suddenly surfaced, and helped fuel a
new and vigorous recovery of the experience of
several generations of men and women whose
voices had been stilled. In the 1990s, these
witnesses could be heard. Alongside them are
Chinese voices, less attesting to identity politics
than to the brutal repression of the cultural
revolution and Tienanmen Square. Simply
recording all these stories will take decades. But
in the course of doing so, scholars are helping to
build up new political and ethnic identities in a
number of volatile regions.

3. Mfluence and commemoration
have tried to emphasise the multifaceted and
eclectic nature of the "memory boom." There
have been political, technological, and
philosophical impulses towards privileging the
subject of memory in many discursive fields. In a
moment, I will address what a demographer would
call "cohort analysis"- the tracing of generations
and the stories they tell over time. There is a
medical dimension to this story to which I shall
also turn albeit briefly. These are the most
important aspects of the efflorescence of interest
in memory I want to describe tonight. The braiding
together of these varied themes is a classic
problem in over-determination.

I

But there is yet another dimension to this story
to which we must attend. It is more about
audiences than about origins, and while not of

fundamental significance, it still is part of the story
of why so many people are talking about "memory"
today. In the west, one important precondition of
the "memory boom" has been affluence. In a
nutshell, rising real incomes and increased
expenditure on education since the Second World
War have helped shift to the right the demand
curve for cultural commodities.
In the history of this rising demand, higher
education has played a central role. Since the
1960s there has been a rapid expansion in the
population of university-trained people, whose
education provided them with access to and a
desire for cultural activities of varying kinds. In
Britain the number of university students
expanded very rapidly after the Robbins report of
1963, granting the right to free higher education
to all who could pass entrance requirements.
There were at least three times as many people
studying in institutions of higher education in
1990 as had been there 30 years before.
The same upward trend in the size of the
tertiary sector of education may be detected across
Europe and in the United States after 1960. Part
of the increase is demographic: the "baby boom"
generation was coming of age; but there was more
at work here than the shadow of post -war fertility.
Systems of higher education differ markedly, but
even with a host of qualifications, the international
trend is evident. There were eight times the
number of students in higher education in
Germany in 1990 compared to 1960; in France,
six times more over the same period; in Italy,
Belgium and Denmark, and the United States, 5
times more. Taken together, the 15 member states
of the European Union had 12 million students
in higher education in 1990; there were about 13.5
million such students in the United States. And
the numbers have continued to grow throughout
the last decade ofthe twentieth century.
The student revolt of 1968 was an effect, not
a cause, of this trend. In France, student numbers
grew more rapidly in 1966-7 than in 1969-70;
German growth was about the same before and
after the "troubles," precipitated in part by rising
numbers and insufficient resources devoted to
them. Changes in higher education had
fundamental effects not only on the skill
composition of the labor force, but also on the
stock of cultural capital circulating in society as a
whole. By the 1990s there was a larger population
of university-educated people than ever before.
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Their demand for cultural products of many
different kinds was evident. What might be
described as the industry of culture was in an ideal
position for massive growth. The market was
there; the target population for cultural products
was there; and after two decades of retrenchment,
state support for "heritage" or le patrimoine was
there, with greater or lesser degrees of generosity.
The British economic historian, Alan Milward,
currently teaching in Florence, has pointed to the
material echoes of these two cultural bywords,
"heritage" and "patrimony." The "memory boom,"
he rightly notes, has happened in part because
both the public and the state have the disposable
income to pay for it. This is how Milward put it in
a recent review of books on memory and history
in Europe in The Times Literary Supplement:
The media are the hypermarket outlet for
the consumption of memory. Stern moral and
methodological rejection of earlier historical
fashions does not alter the reality that this latest
fashion, like the earlier ones, is driven by the
all-too-positivist forces of the growth of wealth
and incomes. The history of memory represents
that stage of consumption in which the latest
product, ego-history, is the image of the self not
only marketed but also consumed by the self.

There are differences among European
countries, but in the British and French cases,
which I know best, there is a symmetry between
economic trends and cultural trends which we
ignore at our peril.
Dwelling on memory is a matter of both
disposable income and leisure time. Milward has
a telling point: affluence has helped turn identity
into a commodity, to be consumed by everyone at
her (increasingly ample) leisure time. A "common"
identity is one sharing a set of narratives about
the past. Many of these take the form of bricks
and mortar - fixed cultural capital. Exploiting
their attractiveness, as in Britain's National Trust
stately homes and gardens, the patrimony or
heritage trades became a profitable industry, with
market niches and target consumers. The
marketing of memory has paid off, in a huge
consumer boom in images of the past- in films,
books, articles, and more recently on the internet
and television. There is an entire industry devoted
to "blockbuster exhibitions" in museums, whose
visitors seem to respond more and more to
spectacular shows. History sells, especially well
as biography or as auto-biography, or in Milward's
(and Pierre Nora's phrase) ego-history.

The British satirical writer Julian Barnes
produced a marvelous reductio ad absurdum of
this phenomenon in his futuristic spoof England,
England, published in 1998. Why should tourists
have to travel to consume the icons of British
history? Surely it makes more sense to bring or
imitate the lot on the Isle of Wight? But whatever
its potential for humour, the history business has
never been more profitable. It would be important,
though, to have more precise information of the
choices cultural consumers make. My hunch is
that over the last two decades, the growth rate in
attendance at the Imperial War Museum, the
British Museum, and Madame Tussaud's in
London, for instance, has been greater than the
increase in attendance at sporting events or rock
concerts. This is a conjecture, but one worth
pursuing in a more rigorous manner.
Affluence has had another by now
commonplace byproduct. One vector of the
"memory boom" may also be the exteriorization,
or expression in public space, of the interior
discourse of psychoanalysis. Just as Woody Allen
has popularized therapy as an addictive way of
life. so the nearly universal spread of therapy
cultures have made memory a light consumer
durable good for those - yet again - with the
cash to afford it.

3. History and family history:
Vectors of transmission
o far I have tried to sketch some of the
political and economic pre-conditions for the
contemporary "memory boom." But there is
another level of significance in this story, one which
is more demographic than political, more about
families than about nations.

S

In our profession, we should be grateful that
history sells; one reason that it is such a popular
and money-making trade is because it locates
family stories in bigger, more universal, narratives.
One way to understand the huge growth and
financial viability of museums and fiction set in
the wars of the twentieth century is to see them as
places where family stories are set in a wider, at
times universal context. Some grandparents knew
the Blitz; now they can bring their grandchildren
to the "Blitz experience" of the Imperial War
Museum in London. Such imaginings of war are
attractive because they rest on the contemporary
link between generations, and in particular
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between the old and the young, between
grandparents and grandchildren, at times over the
heads of the troublesome generation of parents
in the middle. In the 1960s and 1970s, this link
pointed back to the First World War; later on, to
the Second.
Many best-selling novels set in the two world
wars take family stories as their form. Examples
abound: like Jean Rouaud's Champs d'honneur
winner of the Prix Goncourt in 1991, or Sebastian
Japrisot's moving Un long dimanche de
jian.;:aille, or Pat Barker's fictional trilogy on the
Great War, or Sebastian Faulks's powerful
Birdsong. Barker has written a sequel whose
central figure is a l 00-year old veteran and father
of the narrator. Faulks has placed within a later
novel about the Second World War a story of the
transmission of traumatic memory between father
and daughter.
There are deep traces here of the history of
several cohorts, moving through time, across this
fictional landscape. Today's grandparents were
children after the 1914-18 war, and their stories
-family stories- are now imbedded in history,
and fiction, and exhibitions, and museums, and
pilgrimage, in all the stuff of ritual that deepen
the "memory boom." The linkage between the
young and the old now extended substantially
with the life span- is so central to the concept of
memory that its significance may have simply
passed us by.
Let me take a moment to describe a personal
experience which illustrates this point. I have been
privileged to work as one of the creators of an
international museum of the First World War,
located at Peronne, in the Department of the
Somme, an hour north of Paris. Peronne was
German headquarters during the Battle of the
Somme in 1916. This museum was the product
of a specific and fleeting generational moment in
the 1980s, when history became family history,
and therefore could include scripts not yet
inscribed by the French in their national narrative
of the war. Because of family memories, and
traumatic memories at that, we were able to find
a way to justify a major French investment in a
story very few Frenchmen had acknowledged as
of fundamental importance to them and to their
sense of the past. Verdun, that other great disaster
of 1916, had occluded the Somme in France,
despite the fact that the French lost 200,000 men
in the battle.

The man who saw this opportunity was Max
Lejeune, president of the Conseil General, and a
former Defence Minister at the time of Suez. He
was a characteristic Fourth Republic politician,
skilled in the byways of Parisian infighting, but
whose power rested on a personal fiefdom and
following in his own Department of the Somme.
Tourism mattered to him, but so did the memory
of his father, an ancien combattant of the Battle
of the Somme, who had returned from the war a
troubled man. The childhood Lejeune recalled was
not a happy one; the war had broken his father,
and a lifetimes later in the 1980s, his son Max
Lejeune wanted to find a way to put those
memories to rest.
For Lejeune, the idea of a museum originated
in family history, his family history. But his insight
was in seeing that such a museum was a means
of turning national narratives into family
narratives, redolent to a very wide public of several
nationalities. In this way, this venture could bring
French children at the end of the twentieth century
into contact with the world of his childhood, in
the 1920s and 1930s, shadowed as it was by the
Great War. It could also describe the disintegration
of Europe in 1914-18 in a way which highlighted
the urgent tasks of European integration 80 years
later. It could combine nostalgia, ever-present in
family narratives, with a civics lesson in the future
of the new Europe.
With the support of a notable of the eminence
and power of Lejeune, it was possible to secure
the fmancial investment necessary for the creation
of a museum. Ultimately, the project cost 100
million francs. Lejeune also bought the argument,
and inserted it in the budget where it has remained
to this day, that a museum without a research
centre would atrophy over time. Placing historical
debate permanently within the museum, and
funding postgraduate studies for people anywhere
in the world working on the Great War, are steps
which have invigorated the enterprise and ensured
its survival. Without family history (and French
cash), none of this would have been possible.
This positive story should not obscure other,
more difficult, ways in which memories of war
continue to linger even now, more than half a
century after 1945. The "memory boom" has
enabled some people to hide one set of memories
behind another. In France and elsewhere, some
narratives of the First World War help people evade
both personal and national stories about the
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Second World War. This is by no means true
everywhere; in Russia, for example, the First
World War simply vanished as a subject of public
discourse, eclipsed by the Revolutions of 1917
and the civil war which followed it. But where
Collaboration raised uncomfortable questions in
the aftermath of the Second World War, many
people were happy to sing along with the French
troubadour Georges Brassens, "Qu'est-ce que c'est
la guerre que je prefere, c'est la guerre de "1418."

4. Family memory, traumatic
memory, and war
Here the diversion of the narrative from one war
to another was deliberate. Other people were not
so fortunate. When we encounter family stories
about war in this century, we frequently confront
another kind of story-telling, one we have come to
call "traumatic memory." The recognition of the
significance of this kind of memory is one of the
salient features of the contemporary "memory
boom" I take this term to signify an underground
river of recollection, first discussed in the
aftermath of the First World War, but a subject of
increasing attention in the 1980s and 1990s, when
post-traumatic stress disorder became the
umbrella term for those (as it were) stuck in the
past. The "memory boom" of the later twentieth
century arrived in part because of our belated but
real acceptance that among us, within our families,
there are men and women overwhelmed by
traumatic recollection.
War veterans bore the scars of such memories
even when they did not have a scratch on them.
The imagery of the shell-shocked soldier became
generalized after the Second World War. In 193945, the new notation for psychological casualty
was "combat fatigue," an unavoidable wearing out
of one of the components of the military machine.
Holocaust victims had a very different story to tell,
but the earlier vocabulary of trauma was there to
be seized. And seized again. This was true in
commemorative art as much as in medical care.
It is no accident, in my view, that the notation of
Maya Lin's Vietnam Veterans Memorial is that of
Sir Edwin Lutyens's monument to the missing of
the Battle of the Somme at Thiepval. The Great
War created categories which have framed much
of the language we use to describe the traumatic

memories ofvictims of the Second World War, the
Vietnam war and other conflicts.
This is also the case in the field of psychiatry,
where the notion of post-traumatic stress disorder
- previously termed "shell shock" or "combat
fatigue"- was accepted as a recognized medical
diagnostic classification only in 1980, a few years
after the end of the Vietnam war. Once accepted
as a syndrome, PTSD validated entitlements -to
pensions, to medical care, to public sympathy. It
also "naturalized" the status of Vietnam veterans.
The mental scars of Vietnam vets, once
legitimated, could be treated alongside other
victims of urban violence, or sexual or family
trauma. In all these cases, violence seemed to leave
an imprint we now call "traumatic memory."
In this area, enormous progress has been
made over the last 30 years in the field of
neuroscience. The biochemistry of traumatic
memory is now a field of active research, and
various pathways have been identified which help
us distinguish between different kinds of memory
traces. There is now a biochemistry of traumatic
memories, memories which are first buried and
then involuntarily released when triggered by
certain external stimuli. The world of neurology
has had its own "memory boom" which in turn
has helped establish the scientific character and
credentials of the notion of "trauma."
Fiction and fictionalized memoirs have also
been important vectors for the dissemination of
notions of traumatic memory. This has been true
since the Great War, and the appearance in print
of the poems of Wilfred Owen, who did not survive
the war, and Ivor Gurney, who did, but who spent
the rest of his life in a lunatic asylum. Some
veterans may have retreated into silence, but there
were many storytellers among them, and among
their contemporaries, who to this day continue to
teach us much about what "trauma" means.
Virginia Woolfs Mrs Dalloway of 1925 is one
poignant example, the figure of Septimus Smith
was drawn from her encounter with her brotherin-law and his condition. If time permitted, I would
love to dwell on a number of other story-tellers
and their role in the public understanding of
traumatic memory as a fact of twentieth-century
family life. Two recent books, David Grossman's
"See under Love" and Peter Balakian's "The Black
Dog of Fate," are wonderful evocations of this
mood of remembrance.
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5. The "cultural turn" in
historical studies

T

he memory boom of the late twentieth
century is a reflection of a complex matrix of
suffering, political activity, claims for entitlement,
scientific research, philosophical reflection, and
art.
In conclusion, it may be useful to add a few
words about the intersection of these broad trends
with a number of narrower movements within the
historical profession itself. The first may be
described under the heading of "the cultural turn"
in historical studies. When I was an undergraduate
at Columbia, 40 years ago, cultural history was a
form of Geistesgeschichte, a noble tradition in
which German intellectual history was of central
importance. Just emerging in the mid-1960s was
an exciting mixture of disciplines to challenge the
prevailing consensus; it came in many forms, but
probably is best summarized as social scientific
history. Over the next two decades historical
demography and other forms of sociologically- or
anthropologically-inspired historical study
proliferated. Alongside them was a politicallycommitted variation of Marxist thinking which
created labour history. The now essential
historical journal Past & Present was initially subtitled "ajournal of scientific history." The subtitled was discarded; the journal thrived. These
strands of historiographical innovation produced
work of outstanding and enduring quality. But as
broad programmes of historical interpretation,
both of these schools failed to deliver the goods
they had promised. There was no new paradigm
like that of the Annales school of the 1920s and
1930s, promising total history. Instead, the
positivist assumptions of social scientific history
and the heroic narratives of the making of the
working class, wherever it happened to be, began
to fade by the 1970s and 1980s.
Even in Paris, where the phrase "nous les
Annales" still echoed magisterially, the hold of the
old ways of thinking began to loosen. Part of the
challenge came from post-modernists, fed up with
the grand narratives of industrialization or other
forms of linear progress, or unprepared to go on
charting the history of militancy, or the
transformation of a "class in itself' to a "class for
itself." The inspiration behind Les lieux de
memoire was political. After the collapse of the
twin stars in the Parisian firmament, Gaullism
and communism, many scholars of contemporary

history, including Pierre Nora, sought a
reorientation of their outlook through a reflection
on what being French entails. And that meant
seeking out the multiple sites of what he termed
French "memory."
In North America, part of the "cultural turn"
reflected the way the neighbors began to colonize
h~st~~- We sho~ld_note in particular the increasing
s1gmf1cance w1thm historical study of literary
scholarship, offering fundamental contributions
to the cultural history of the First World War, at
least in the Anglo-Saxon world. Feminist scholars
have brought to this subject and to many others
powerful new perspectives. No one today writes
about the cultural history of imperialism without
some meditation on the work of Edward Said and
some reflection on that protean concept,
"Orientalism." And one need not agree with
everything Steven Greenblatt has had to say in
order to appreciate the excitement of his ideas
and those of his colleagues at Berkeley who edit
the journal Representations. There were as many
panels on subjects in cultural history at the 1999
Modern Languages Association meeting in San
Francisco as there were at the American Historical
Association meeting in Chicago the following year.
Where once French or French-inspired
historians had sought out clues towards the
features of the unchanging mental furniture of a
society, loosely defined as mentalite, by the late
1980s many were looking at language and
representations. Roger Chartier has helped bury
the outmoded distinction in cultural history
between "superstructure" and "substructure" by
insisting that "The representations of the social
world themselves are the constituents of social
reality." Gareth Stedman Jones echoed the same
point in his influential study Languages of Class,
~ublishe~ in 1983. German scholars, following
first Remhard Koselleck, in the study of
Begriffsgeschichte, or historical semantics, or
following the work of Jan Assmann and Aleida
Assmann, have created an entire literature in the
field of cultural memory. And these seminal works
are but the crest of a much wider wave of
scholarship they have inspired and informed.
Globalization is evident in the spread of these
approaches to the study of memory. Saul
Friedlander and his students in Israel, Germany
and America helped launch the successful journal
History & Memory in 1987. Oral historians in
many countries have added their voices, and have
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helped ensure that the study of "memory" is
informed by a sensitivity to issues of gender.
In much of this broad field ofwork, Foucault
and Lacan have been the inspiration; other
scholars have found much in the reflections of
Lyotard or Kristeva about the ruins of symbolic
language in the aftermath of the Holocaust. Postmodernist interventions have returned time and
again to memory, as a site of nostalgia. Some
favour turning to the individual's stories as the
cornerstone for the recovery of the subject, whose
position is always in question.
Others in the field of critical theory are
sceptical about all the talk about memory. To
Kerwin Klein, the memory boom is a betrayal of
the radical credentials of critical theory, for it
"marries hip new linguistic practices with some
of the oldest senses of memory as a union of divine
presence and material object." In some hands,
Klein argues, the evocation of memory becomes a
kind of"cultural religiosity," a "re-enchantment"
of our sense of the past.
By the 1990s these critical standpoints and
innovative approaches clearly occupied an
influential, though certainly not hegemonic,
position in the discipline. Some style the sum of
these contributions as the "linguistic turn," simply
meaning the general acceptance that there are no
historical "facts" separate from the language in
which they are expressed in time and place. Others
call it the "cultural turn," meaning the
concentration on signifying practices in the past
as a major focus of current historical research.
Whatever it is termed, and whatever its
origins, the tide has indeed turned, and cultural
history is now all around us. It has benefitted from
the influx of refugees from Marxist or marxisant
history, who watched their historical paradigm
disintegrate well before the Berlin Wall was
breached. At times, cultural history has taken an
entirely idealist turn, in the sense of suggesting
that representations constitute the only reality.
This is an extreme position, but it does exist.
However configured, the "cultural turn" in
historical study describes an agenda of real
popularity and potential. Students are voting with
their feet here: economic, demographic and labor
history have not kept their audiences; to a degree,
cultural history has drawn them away.

There is a time-lag in the way institutions
respond to these intellectual trends in our
profession. But by the 1990s it became apparent
that the subject of cultural history was growing in
popularity among students and scholars in such
a way as to require appointments, grants,
promotions, and so on. Reinforcing the trend is
the way in which publishers respond positively to
projects in cultural history, and less positively to
other specialisms. Their reaction is part of the
story I have tried to illustrate earlier tonight:
cultural history sells.
And not only in the academic market. Given
the contraction of university jobs in history in
Britain, and a steady state elsewhere in Europe,
and given chronic instability and over supply in
the American job market, the future of many
younger scholars in the academy has been bleak
indeed. One way forward for them - and not only
for them - is into the expanding field of public
history. And in this field, the subject of memory
is de rigueur. The story of the Historial de la
grande guerre is only one among many.
All this is entirely invigorating, and an antidote
to some of the conservative features of our
discipline. Obstacles still remain. We must not
underestimate the extent to which many historians
consider "popularity" to be synonymous with
"superficiality" and believe that any idea that is
expressed clearly must be deeply flawed. Others
find the subject of cultural history vague and the
notion of memory perilously ill-defined. And at
times they are right.
One of the challenges of the next decade or so
is to try to draw together some of these disparate
strands of interest and enthusiasm through a more
rigorous and tightly-argued set of propositions
about what exactly memory is, and what it has
been in the past. The only fixed point at this
moment is the near ubiquity of the term. No one
should delude herself into thinking we all use it
the same way. But just as we use words like love
and hate without ever knowing their full or shared
significance, so we are bound to go on using the
term "memory," the historical signature of our own
generation.
Jay Winter is currently Professor of Modern
History at Yale University.
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